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Bess's Valentine
The unwanted
present and other
horrors in the
world of
gifts.
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n Valentine's Day two years ago the door bell rang around six in the
evening. At the door were the four-year old boy who lived around the
comer and his mother. They had a valentine that they wanted to give to
Bess, my then three-year old daughter. My wife answered the door and seeing
what the occasion for the visit was went to Bess's play table and got the valentine
she had had Bess make for the boy that afternoon. I marveled at my wife's skill in
handling this. How in the world did she know to be ready for this exchange? The
boy, a year older than our daughter, was not a very frequent playmate of Bess's
and we were only on cordial but stand-offishly neighborly terms with his parents.
What luck, I thought, that she had thought to have something ready for the boy.
But then the glitch occurred. What Bobby handed over to Bess was an expensive
doll, some twenty dollars worth. It was not a recycled toy, but had clearly been
bought for this occasion. What Bess handed Bobby was some scribbling, representing an attempt to draw a heart, and a cookie that my wife, with Bess's
indispensable assistance, had baked that afternoon. Things broke up quickly after
the exchange. We had been fixing dinner when they appeared and Bobby and his
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mother only got far enough beyond the threshold so that we could close the storm door
on the cold air outside. There was an undeniable look of disappointment on the boy 's
face when he left and Bess, though hardly disappointed, was mildly bewildered at
having gotten such a nice gift out of the blue. As soon as the door closed my wife
expressed her embarrassment and acute discomfort. What could we do? How could we
repay them? How could we rectify the situation? I too felt embarrassed although not
quite to the same extent as Kathy, for it was not me who was going to have to have
future dealings with Bobby and his mother. It is also true that both Kathy and I felt
some amusement with our embarrassment. Discomfitures of this sort are funny even at
the cost of your own pain. And of course, academic that I am, I started immediately
wondering about why we felt acutely embarrassed and maybe even shamed and
Bobby's mother did not, because she did not manifest any sense that something had
not been quite right in the exchange.
The structure of the Valentine exchange can be described as a simple game. The
players each have one move and each must make their move (in this instance the move
is giving a gift to the other) without knowledge of what the other has given them. That
is, each person must commit to their move in the dark about what the other player' s
move is. The object of the game is to come as close as you can to matching the other's
move or, in one slight variant version of the same game, to doing ever so slightly
better than the other, i.e., matching plus a peppercorn. In both versions of the game
both players lose if there is great discrepancy between their moves. Both win if there
is a small increment between their moves. The one who gives x plus peppercorn does
a little better than the other, but only a little, and everyone feels pretty good. Normal
social interaction presents various versions of this game fairly frequently. Interest
arbitration, Christmas gift exchanges, choosing how to dress for a party or other social
function in which it is not totally clear that there is one correct way of attiring oneself,
all follow this pattern. Birthday gift exchanges, however, follow a different structure
unless the players celebrate their birthdays on the same day. Certain broad skills are
necessary to play this game well no matter what its particular setting may be. Adept
players must understand the norms that govern the situation; they must also have the
ability to judge the other party's understanding of those norms and his or her willingness to adhere to them even if understood, and they must make reasonably accurate
assessments of the other party's assessments of themselves in these matters.
What winning in the gift exchange means is not getting the best present. That is
what Kathy and I understood to be a loss. Winning is guessing what the other will give
and giving a gift adequate to requite it. Social norms do the work of coordinating
people's behavior so that a good portion of the time these interactions pass without
glitch. We know what to give and how much to spend and we reasonably expect that
others know what we know and that they will act accordingly. Small variations can be
tolerated; they are even desired to some extent. If, for instance, you want to dress at a
level of formality that will accord with everyone else you might still want to wear
something more tasteful or nicer looking within that level of formality than other
people are wearing. If I give you a gift costing $12 and you give me one costing $10
no one is embarrassed. But when what I gave you cost a dime and what you gave me
cost $20 we should, if we are properly socialized, feel awkward and embarrassed. The
embarrassment, however, will not be equally distributed. The person who spent the
most will feel the least embarrassed, generally speaking. Why? We can even make the
question a little harder by referring back to Bess' s valentine. Why was it that we, my
wife and I, felt greater unpleasant feelings, when we followed the norms governing the
situation, than I am supposing Bobby's mother did, who clearly broke the rules by
vastly exceeding the norms of exchange for little kids on Valentine's Day?
Just what are the sources of embarrassment, shame, humiliation, and even guilt
(perhaps) that were provoked by this situation? The low rollers cannot feel embarrassed that they broke the rules of the Valentine game, because they didn't. By one
account the high rollers, if embarrassed, are embarrassed more because they caused
the low rollers' embarrassment than because they exceeded the norms of propriety
governing the game. No doubt there is a causal connection between the high rollers'

embarrassment and their failure to adhere to the norms of the valentine game inasmuch as that was what caused the low rollers' embarrassment, but that would be
getting the psychology of it wrong. Their experience is one of second-order embarrassment, the embarrassment of witnessing another's embarrassment, not the primary
embarrassment of having done something embarrassing. It seems that what is going
on here is that there is more than one game being played and there are more than one
set of norms governing the transaction. The true source of the low rollers' embarrassment is that they have also been shamed by being bested in a much more primitive
game of gift exchange, one in which every gift demands a return. The simple fact
remains that a gift demands an adequate return even if that gift, by its size, broke the
rules governing the particular exchange. The norms of adequate reciprocity trumped
the norms of Valentine's Day. Yet there is a cost here born by the high rollers.
Because the high rollers defied the normal expectation they do not acquire honor to
the extent that they caused shame. Their action, in effect, has made the whole transaction less than zero-sum.
A somewhat different account also suggests itself. I have been supposing the
giver's lack of primary embarrassment. But it might be that Bobby' mother was more
than embarrassed by embarrassing us, she might have felt humiliated, not by breaking
the rules of the Valentine's Day game, but by having to realize how greatly more she
valued us than we valued her. Her pain then, if pain she felt, was not really a function
of misplaying the Valentine game, in the same way ours was. To be sure, the game
provided the setting for her humiliation but it needn't have. Her pain, in other words,
was not caused by having violated the norms of Valentine's Day; it was caused by
overvaluing us and this could have occurred in any number of settings. In contrast, our
pain was solely a function of Valentine's Day glitch. Yet I suspect that she felt no
humiliation whatsoever, for the situation provided her with an adequate non-demeaning explanation for the smallness of our gift. Our gift, she would know, was exactly
what the situation called for. The normal expectations of the situation thus shielded
her from more painful knowledge.
The peculiar facts of Bess' s gift show us also that who ends up bearing the costs of
norm transgression will depend on the makeup of the opposing sides. Our discussion
above assumed high-roller and low-roller to be individual actors in a one-on-one game
(the plural and theys were adapted solely to solve the gender crisis in third person
singular narration), but in Bess's situatioµ there was mother and son on one side and
mother and daughter on the other. Speaking now again only as to the emotions
engendered by the game of exchange itself, Bobby's mother felt no shame and only a
little embarrassment. Bess' s mother felt much embarrassment. Bess felt quite pleased.
But Bobby, alas poor Bobby. Here was the true bearer of the cost of his mother's
indiscretion. Let us take ourselves back to Bobby and his mom as they set out for our
house. Bobby, we can reasonably suppose, is deeply envious of Bess' s gift and has
been sick with desire for a similar gift since he has known that his mother purchased
the gift for Bess. Recall the sick and painful experience of attending other kids'
birthday parties when you were little. But Bobby can console himself with the
knowledge that this is not a birthday gift but a Valentine gift. The return will be
immediate, not miserably deferred as it is with birthday gifts. And just what has
Bobby's mother lead him to believe he will be receiving? I can't predict just what, but
I would guess it was a little more exciting than Bess' s scribblings and one chocolate
chip cookie (made according to a health food recipe no less).
Why was our discomfort so utterly unassuaged by the knowledge that our gifts
involved our own efforts; they at least bore some part of our person (or at least Bess's
and Kathy's)? For some reason our personalized efforts did not match the larger
money expenditure of the other party. Was it just the money? It can't be that, because
if Bobby had handed Bess a $20 bill we would have refused the gift without that much
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anxiety. Here a breach of norms governing the form of the gift (e.g., no money unless
under very certain conditions) is not as capable of embarrassing the receiver, if at all,
as breaches of norms governing the value of the gift. But we need to be more specific.
The failure to abide by the norms governing the value of the gift only embarrasses the
receiver if it exceeds the value of the normal gift; embarrassment is the lot of the giver
if the gift's value is less than the norm. It seems in the end that our judgments are also
quite particularized, taking into account not only the money spent, but time and energy
expended, the uniqueness of the gift, the seriousness of it, how individualized it is,
how much such things mean to the giver, how much they mean to the receiver, the
state ofrelations between the parties, and so on. Our cookie and Bess's scribbling
were not going to balance the money and the time Bobby's mother took in picking out
a gift for Bess. Our cookies were promiscuous. They were meant to be eaten by us and
by anyone who stumbled by when we were eating them. When it is not clear that the
personalized effort of one party was significant, when the labors engaged in could also
be interpreted as an attempt to avoid spending money, then monetary value will
probably trump mere expenditures of effort. Obviously these rankings can undergo
readjustment. If Bess were a recognized art prodigy, if Kathy were a professional
cook, then our gifts would carry other meanings, as they would, too, if Bobby were the
Cookie Monster.
One of the immediate moves that the embarrassed recipient makes is desperately to
try to reconstruct a plausible account for the breach, to attempt to interpret it away by
supposing legitimizing or justifying states of mind for the giver. Perhaps she was
playing a different game. Could the value of the gift be partially excused because
Bobby was a year older than Bess, or because Bobby was a boy, or because she had a
warm spot for Bess, or a warm spot for Kathy? Was this really a gift initiating
courtship in which gifts do not demand returns in the same specie? Was it simply that
Bobby's mother ne.ver stinted in buying Bobby any and everything and that the toy
they bought Bess had a much lower value to them than it did to us? Was she known to
be inept in these kinds of things and hence each subsequent ineptitude bore a diminishing power to humiliate and embarrass? Or was the embarrassment that we feared
she might be making a pitiable attempt to buy our friendship, in which case, our very
palpable embarrassment at our own failings would be compounded with feeling
embarrassed for her as well? Whatever, no amount of such explanation for her action
made us feel any less embarrassed. And we had played by the rules! But, as it turns
out, only by the rules of the Valentine's game. This game, as we discovered, was
nested within a larger game of honor, and that game we had lost.
The cost of our losing was our minor humiliation and shame and our great embarrassment. In our culture in that particular setting it was a cost we could bear. In other
settings we may have had to suffer the sanction of being reputed cheap and even
ostracized on account of it. In other cultures the humiliation and shame exact a greater
toll. Reuters recently published the following story picked up by papers as column
filler:
Monday June 10, 1991, Bejing:
Scorn Over Gift Leads to Double Suicide.
A couple from northern China committed suicide on their nephew's wedding day
after relatives scoffed at the value of their gift to him, a Shanghai newspaper said.
Following custom, the couple from the province of Shanxi wrote in a gift book
that they were giving a total of $3.70 as a wedding gift, less than half the $8.50 other
relatives gave, said the Xinmin Evening News.
Unable to bear their relatives' scorn and worried about future wedding gifts for
their other nephews and nieces, husband Yang Baosheng hanged himself after his
wife, Qu Junmei, drowned herself in a vat, the newspaper said.
For Reuters and the newspapers that printed it, the story was clearly intended to be
comical in a black way, an example of the strange behavior of people with strange
names. The story is told as one of silly people who kill themselves for trifles. Any
possibility of tragedy is skillfully prevented by several devices. There are the strange
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names. There is the detail of drowning in a vat which carries with it all the indignities
of pure farce. And above all there are details of the money amounts involved. These
people committed suicide because of $4.80. And of course therein lies the real comedy
of the presentation. Such levels of poverty and economic underdevelopment are so
unthinkable for us as to be a source of amusement and wonder. I don't want to be too
melodramatic or even assume for more than a few sentences a tone of moral superiority. But it should be easy to discern the unfathomable shame and the desperate
reassertion of dignity that these people tried to accomplish with their suicides. Suicide
proved them anything but shameless and hence showed them to be people of honor.
Reuters got their genre wrong. This is not comedy, but the stuff of epic and tragedy.
This man and his wife were people who still understood the style and spirit of the
heroic. And as for me: I hardly succeed in avoiding the self-satisfied tone of moral
superiority at Reuters expense by adopting a self-congratulatory tone of literary
critical superiority. But these peoples' honor survives my stylistic troubles.

MONEY AS GIFT
Money has peculiar traits as economists have known for a few centuries and
theologians have suspected for even longer. It works well in the world of commerce
because none of its possessors' selves attaches to it once it is transferred. To the extent
that any of our person attaches to money, the less useful the particular money substance is as money. We want money to move, to be current, to mean as much to one
person as to another. It is a virtue for money to be promiscuous and it may be that that
was why moralists of the middle ages had such a hard time with the idea of it, if not
with the thing itself. What makes money particularly suitable as money, however, is
what makes it generally unsuitable as a gift. It comes without any aspect of the giver's
person attached to it. No time was taken to think of an appropriate gift. No lines were
waited in, no traffic jams endured, no particularizing of gift to receiver was undertaken. Nor are we willing to credit givers with the time it took them to make the
money they are giving. The clock starts running only once the donor consciously
begins the process of giving.
Personalization cannot be supplied by giving money in the form of a check. The
donor's signature can be seen to be as much an emblem of how little time the giver
wants to put into giving as a sign of personalization. It is, after all, much easier to
write a check than to go to the bank or teller machine to get cash. Moreover, by virtue
of the check the donor has also "gifted" that labor to the recipient who must now go to
the bank and stand in line to deposit the check. This labor can be a labor of love if the
check is big enough. If gifts of money are going to be made there is an understanding
that above a certain amount a check is the proper way to effect the transfer. But there
can be no doubt that recipients are more likely to find a gift of $10 less risible if made
in cash rather than by check.
Yet although we feel that little if any of our inner being, our real selves, attaches to
gifts of money we also feel that money has an extraordinary capacity to bear the
physical excrescences of those that have touched it before it gets to our hands and by
those that will touch it after it has been in our hands. Money is magical, blackmagical, in this respect. It carries the slough of others which is always rubbing off it
and dirtying those that touch it without ever becoming clean for all the filth that leaps
from it. But this is not inconsistent with our sense that money is current and promiscuous, that it is meant to stay with no one for very long. The main virtue of money is its
ability to go out from us at a moment's notice, not unlike excrement in the broad sense
of sweat, feces, fingernail parings, hair, skinflakes, dandruff, saliva. Money is that
which leaves us try as we might to restrain it. We exude it, after a fashion. So money
is doubly cursed from the point of view of a gift. It is not just that it conveys none of
our person, none of our spirit, but that it also conveys too much of our person in the
sense of dull matter and filth. This is part of the explanation of the custom of making
gifts of money in the form of crisp new bills sometimes in a special envelope designed
solely to carry bills. Such pristine money is not quite money because it is not yet
filthy. This is why we are often reluctant to spend a new bill, especially one that has
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been given as a gift and this is why when we give money we usually do so in the form
of new bills. (A gift of new bills also indicates that special time was devoted to the gift
since to obtain the bills a trip to the bank would have to have been undertaken.)
Money is seldom an appropriate gift unless it moves down generational levels or
down status gradients. The employer can give the employee a Christmas bonus,
parents can gift their kids money as can aunts and uncles their nieces and nephews. If
money moves up the status grades it is seldom by way of gift. It then takes on the
trappings of tribute, taxes, or protection money. Medieval people understood this only
too well. A real risk was incurred anytime a gift went from low to high. It raised the
expectation that it would be made again on every anniversary of the first giving, since
not to give under the same circumstances that had provoked the gift in the first place
would not be of neutral significance. It is one thing not to give at all, it is another to
give and then to cease giving. It would suggest displeasure or disapproval of a
superior, a desire to distance oneself, and as such would be a hostile gesture, a show of
rebelliousness, that not giving would not have had if a gift had never been made
earlier. Gifts thus had ways of rather quickly becoming mandatory exactions, of
becoming customs, which we note still can bear the sense of exaction as with "clearing
customs." Gifts of the faithful to God, his saints, and his ministers here on earth are
more complex although in some respects they can be subsumed into any of the three
categories we listed above: tribute, taxes, and protection. Some churchmen were able
to complicate this picture, and not quite unconsciously, when they posed as humble
and poor servants of the faithful, as lower-status beneficiaries of higher-status contributors. We should say they did both; they played the lord when they extracted tithes
from the poor, often rather indelicately, and they played the humble servant when they
cajoled benefactioMs from people they were willing to call benefactors.
If gifts moving up the status grades mimicked the behavior of taxation, gifts
moving down the status grades mimicked the sociology and style of charity and alms.
We can thus observe that our nervousness about gifts of money is more than just a
function of such gifts being insufficiently individualized or inadequately time consuming in the making. Because gifts of money almost always go from those who have to
those who don't, from high status to low, from older established to younger
unestablished, they can have the look and feel of charity. A gift of money suggests that
the person to whom it is given needs everything, not just a particular thing, and as
such it has the capacity to insult in a different way from the latent insult implicit in
gifts in general. This is why the gift of money must be so carefully limited to the
precise circumstances that normalize it and euphemize it. It is thus proper to give
money at key life-cycle events that show passage from tutelage to emancipation, at
times, that is, when all recognize that the recipient is young and unestablished, the
very purpose of the gift helping him or her make the transition to establishment.
Although this varies enormously depending on social class and ethnic identification,
gifts of money thus tend to be made at confirmations, graduations, and weddings. The
structural resemblance of gifts of money to charity helps legitimate for some the
practice of actually giving money to a charity instead of to the person who is the
subject of the occasion. For example, a common bar-mitzvah gift was to give to a
charity in the name and to the honor of the kid getting bar-mitzvahed. How was a
thirteen-year old supposed to understand or reply? Most mothers insisted on thank-you
notes from their reluctant sons and of one it is reported that he took vengeance by
writing the exact same thank-you note that he sent to everyone else: Dear Mr and Mrs
G-: Thank you very much for the $20 contribution to the Torah fund in my name. I
will put it to very good use. Sincerely yours, Bill M. Such gifts are clearly public
gestures of the giver to an audience that includes the kid's parents but not the kid at
all. The kid incurred no obligation to the donor, only the parents did, who conspired to
make the kid act as if a gift had been made to him. If the kid had any obligation in the
matter it was prior to the gift; it was the obligation to obey his parents or at least not to
embarrass them before their friends. Gifts of money can also be made at other times to

people whose status legitimates the gift, but we cannot give gifts of money to our
equals or our superiors; only downward. The receiver of services in which the service
involves bringing material things or taking them away can reward the server with
cash; such are tips to waitpersons or Christmas gifts to letter carriers and garbage men.
Here the status determinants are purely local. The custom changes when the server is a
member of certain prestige professions in which the services provided are more
abstract and magical as with doctors, professors, lawyers. When gifts are made to
these persons they are never money.
Gifts of money, then, confirm relations of dominance and inferiority, whether the
gift moves up as taxes and tribute or down as charity. They also prompt different kinds
of expectations regarding recompense. If gifts of money had to be repaid in the same
kind as in the case of gifts of durables with durables and gifts of consumables with
consumables, it would be virtually impossible to maintain a fiction that the gift was a
gift instead of a loan. Exchanges of consumables and durables are almost never
identical exchanges. There are so many different types of goods and foods; if I give
you a book and you buy me a book some time later you will not buy me the same
book. But money is money, a set of one member. It is thus that the requital of gifts of
money explicitly takes on the form of admissions and confirmations of the status
differences that legitimated the gift of money in the first place. Money gifts are not to
be repaid in the same specie. Receivers are to give thanks and display gratitude; they
are to feel constrained to use the money "wisely," which is a euphemistic way of
saying that they should use it in a way that accords with the values or expectations of
the giver. Receivers often feel that such gifts oblige them to make similar gifts to
others situated as they were when and if they manage to get themselves situated as
their benefactor had been. Children repay their parents by being generous to their own
children, the one-time student abroad repays the generosity showed him or her by
doing likewise to the nationals of that country when they are here and so on. In such a
way, even if the recipient understands vaguely that money is indeed moving to requite
the initial obligation, it still does so in a way that reaffirms the original gift as a gift
and not a loan and reconfirms the social differentiation that it helped constitute.

THE GIFT SHOP
Even where gifts of money might be desired by the recipient and rendered acceptable by the setting, donors are often unwilling to give it, preferring instead to buy a
durable. Some recipients even self-deceive into thinking they prefer the durable rather
than the money. I am hinting here at one small facet of the collection of practices that
surround wedding gifts. This is a rich area of practice with much local variation and so
I wish to restrict myself to one small point: the function of the gift shop. The taboo
against gifts of money drives the custom of the self-signatured GIFT, those objects
that proclaim their status as gift. These are what a gift shop sells. They are the myriad
of items of minimal utility, usually slightly overdone even when bearing other signs of
TASTEFULNESS, and generally priced higher than the same thing can be found in a
non-gift shop. (The gift shop need not be an autonomous shop. General department
stores have a "gifts" section). Items often are silvery or transparent as if to give them a
certain liminal quality. If the object purports to be something useful its use must be
severely limited. Thus eating utensils and table settings bought for gifts are not
earmarked for daily use. They are to be SPECIAL and as such are intended to stand in
some kind of constantly messaged and obvious symbolic relation to the occasion that
elicited them. They must bear the markings of a gift, that is, of something one would
never buy for oneself.
It may be that some people like to receive such things, but it is a fact that many
people prefer to give these things rather than things that are marked by evident utility.
We can suggest several reasons for the practice. The giver of a gift-shop gift is seldom
a close relative. Close kin can give money or things more personal, like clothing. Giftshop patrons are people who feel money gifts inappropriate and who are not intimate
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enough with the recipient to select gifts that are truly personalized. They are often
people who are obliged to make a gift not because of any connection to the recipient
but by virtue of a relation to other family members or friends of the recipients. These
are not people, in other words, who are seeking intimacy with the recipients. They do
not want to enter into a cycle of exchange with them at all, but rather are continuing an
exchange cycle with, for instance, the recipient's parents. What they seek is a gift that
signals that they have fulfilled the social demands the occasion arguably obliged them
with, a gift that proclaims "We have fulfilled our obligation to buy a gift and we want
no return beyond a thank-you note that shows that you acknowledge we have discharged our obligation." Gift-shop gifts proclaim that they come with as few strings
attached as any gift possibly can. They are ritual artifacts, hence the preference for
objects of marginal utility, silvery or transparent. They are not to benefit the recipient
so much as to indicate the proper ritual behavior of the giver. The joke (a joke at least
to those familiar with the elaborate practices of cyclical gift exchanges of Melanesia
and New Guinea) is that these ritual objects end up being objects of one of the few
cyclical exchanges we modem Americans engage in: the regiving as gifts the gifts we
receive from gift shops, in an eternally recurring cycle, to others on their weddings,
graduations, or for the births of their kids. No shell necklaces for us, but an occasional
shell ashtray might pass from hand to closet to hand to closet to hand to closet and
never come to its final resting place.
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